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Game Theory
This course does not walk through a catalogue of solution concepts. It takes game theory apart as an argument: which assumptions are needed to write an interaction as strategies, outcomes and preferences; whether each step is a hypothesis of a theorem, something true by definition, or a modelling commitment asserting that a formal object represents something real; and where each solution concept gives a confident and wrong answer. The last chapter audits the first six.
结构交底
本课交付的结构
It carries to pricing, negotiation, regulatory design and protocol consensus; it fails where the participants and the available moves are themselves changed by the interaction.
核心承诺
01Outcomes are joint Each person's best choice depends on the others', so you cannot solve your own side first.
02Preference only ranks Utility is an ordering of outcomes; talk of expected values requires a further assumption about lotteries.
03Equilibrium is a consistency condition A solution concept says which situations are self-consistent, not which one will occur.
掌握路径
L1Restate and bound
学完能
- Write an interaction in strategic or extensive form
- State exactly what 'rational' means here and what it does not include
L2Separate definition from modelling
学完能
- Tell whether a step is a hypothesis, a definition, or a modelling commitment
- Point to where a definition is presented as a discovery
概念地图
Nash equilibrium
A profile in which nobody gains by moving alone.
第 3 章
章节
0 / 7 章已读
01
The minimal object: strategies, outcomes, preferences
What an interaction is written as, and exactly what 'rational' means here.
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02
Dominance and iterated deletion: how far without equilibrium
Each extra round spends one more layer of belief.
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03
Nash equilibrium: a consistency condition
What it guarantees, and what it never guarantees.
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04
Order and commitment: extensive form and backward induction
Why a strategy must cover nodes that are never reached.
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05
Information: information sets and common knowledge
Perfect information and complete information are two different things.
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06
Probability enters: expected utility and mixed strategies
The price of the existence theorem, and how to read a mixture.
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07
Reverse audit: checking the modelling commitments of chapters 1–6
The audit covers chapters 1 to 6, including right conclusions reached wrongly.
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