The source of error: the will exceeding the intellect
An account that turns an epistemic problem into a question of responsibility.
延伸阅读
A mismatch of scope
The Fourth Meditation has an awkward question to answer: if my faculties come from a non-deceiving God, why do I still get things wrong. Descartes's answer does not appeal to a defective faculty but to a mismatch of scope between two of them — will exceeding intellect — and what it does in the argument is turn 'why do I get things wrong' from a question about the faculties into a question about their use.
The power to suspend
For the account above to hold, one more thing must be supplied: that I really am able to refrain when things are not clear. Descartes calls this the freedom of the will and says it is in me without limit. It is the load-bearing wall of the chapter and the least argued step in it — the natural light tells me so, and 'it tells me so' is exactly the class that was supposed to need underwriting. Seeing this makes the shape plain: chapter 4's circle returns here in another form.
From mismatched scope to transferred responsibility
What is being reconstructed is the Fourth Meditation's solution, and which kind of problem it swaps for which.
Cracks in this reading
The 'mismatch of scope' reading as a testable specification
The reading under test: the Fourth Meditation uses the difference between two faculties' ranges to defend God, holding each faculty perfect in itself.