Crisis: malinvestment and the cost of liquidation
The strongest passage in the book, and the least falsifiable.
延伸阅读
When the gap surfaces
The gap left by chapter 2 — a detour length the signal supports but the physical stock cannot — is invisible while projects are starting. It surfaces at the moment the resources needed to continue stop arriving. That is malinvestment: not 'too much investment' but investment whose time structure does not match the time structure of the physical supply. Everything the book says about slumps follows from this one line.
Liquidation feeding itself
Once liquidation begins, selling depresses prices, lower prices raise the real burden of nominal debt, and more holders are forced to sell. Fisher called this debt deflation. It runs against the previous mechanism: that one says malinvestment must be cleared, this one says clearing itself destroys more than the malinvestment. The book acknowledges only the first, and that is its most substantive disagreement with its opponents.
From 'malinvestment exists' to 'do not rescue'
What is being derived is the book's policy conclusion, with each step tagged — the controversy sits almost entirely on one of them.
Precision, not size, decides the conclusion
Cracks in this framework
When the gap surfaces, as a preregistrable test
The mechanism under test: a distorted rate signal, through projects started that cannot be finished, produces clustered liquidation.